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Abstract: Against a background of already thin markets in some sectors of major public sector infrastructure in Australia and the desire 
of Australian federal government to leverage private finance, concerns about ensuring sufficient levels of competition are prompting federal 
government to seek new sources of in-bound Foreign Direct Income. The aim of this paper is to justify and develop a means to deploying 
the eclectic paradigm of internationalisation that forms part of an Australian federally funded research project designed to explain the 
determinants of multinational contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects. Despite the 
dominance of the eclectic paradigm as a theory of internationalisation for over two decades, it has seen limited application in terms of 
multinational construction. It is expected that the research project will be the first empirical study to deploy the eclectic paradigm to in-
bound FDI to Australia whilst using the dominant economic theories advocated for use within the eclectic paradigm. Furthermore, the 
research project is anticipated to yield a number of practical benefits. These include estimates of the potential scope to attract more 
multinational contractors to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure, including the nature and extent to which this scope can be 
influenced by Australian governments responsible for the delivery of infrastructure. On the other hand, the research is also expected to 
indicate the extent to which indigenous and other multinational contractors domiciled in Australia are investing in special purpose 
technology and achieving productivity gains relative to foreign multinational contractors.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Reflecting population growth, migration and demographic changes 
the OECD (2006) estimates infrastructure spending of US$53 
trillion between 2007~2030. Whilst in Australia, Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia (2010) has summarized estimates of 
required infrastructure over the next decade from $455 billion to 
more than $770 billion (in 2007 terms). In order to fund 
infrastructure requirements in Australia, Hepworth (2010) reports 
that the Federal Infrastructure Minister considers that the private 
sector would need to play an even greater role in financing 
infrastructure. However, global and domestic demand for 
infrastructure is highlighting a lack of construction capacity and 
supply in some sectors of Australian public sector major 
infrastructure (Banks 2005). Indeed,  with reference to data 
concerning the construction industry from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, de Valence (2003) comments that the industry is highly 
concentrated in a small number of large contractors and this sector 
of the industry is an oligopoly with high barriers to entry including 
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prequalification systems. Given this concentration, seeking to 
leverage private finance amidst severe constraints associated with 
global financial conditions can exacerbate this already thin market 
and result in a manifest lack of competition. In some cases, projects 
have been switched from a proposed Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) to a traditionally funded mode of project delivery. In 
response, at least in part, to the lack of competition, the Federal 
government has noted its desire to see new foreign entrants into the 
Australian public sector major infrastructure market and in 
pursuance of this, is developing a number of initiatives including 
trade-delegation style meetings and reforms to PPP procurement 
practice to reduce bid costs (Hepworth, 2010 and Cameron 2008). 
Where new foreign entrants seek to bid for Australian public 
sector infrastructure through mergers and/or acquired subsidiaries, 
then it does not follow that a change in ownership will increase 
price competition. It’s also important to note that the net benefits of 
a greater number of competing firms and more price competition 
can be debated. Perfect competition and a high level of price 
competition can lead to short term opportunistic behavior and 
under investment generally, and in a PPP bid too much competition 
may detract from innovation given the high bidding costs. In 
contrast, particular markets with limited competition may exhibit 
greater technological change, as above normal profits can be 
invested in new special purpose technology. At the current time, 
research on this issue is inconclusive (Layton, Robinson and 
Tucker 2009).  
This paper does not seek to show the relative merits of either 
more or less competition. Rather, the aim of this paper is to justify 
and develop a means to deploying the eclectic paradigm of 
internationalisation in an Australian Federally funded research 
project designed to explain the determinants of multinational 
contractors’ willingness to bid for Australian public sector major 
infrastructure projects and which may better inform decision 
making concerning the public sector major infrastructure market. 
This research project will involve international case studies and a 
global survey of multinational contractors. In the next section, the 
eclectic paradigm of internationalisation is briefly introduced and 
given the nature of the construction industry, its relevance 
explained. The research gap is then identified and in doing so, the 
main critique of examples of empirical work hitherto relating to the 
eclectic paradigm is mentioned. An approach to deploying the 
eclectic paradigm is developed, in terms of the selection and 
operationalisation of theories to be used within the paradigm in the 
research project concerned. Finally, the conclusions mention 





2. THE ECLECTIC (OLI) PARADIGM OF 
INTERNATIONALISATION 
 
Theories pertaining to multinational enterprise (MNE) - defined as 
owning and controlling activities across different countries (Caves 
1993:64), did not become mainstream until the 1970s. Not only 
was the MNE a relatively new phenomenon, but theories of the 
firm and internationalisation progressed independently until around 
1960. A MNE may develop either horizontally, vertically, or 
through conglomerate extension/diversification (Caves, 1993: 64). 
Horizontal diversification involves producing more of the same 
product elsewhere, whereas vertical integration involves 
investment in earlier or later stages of producing its current output, 
and conglomeration occurs when the firm moves into an unrelated 
type of production.  However, convention has been to study these 
developments based on international manufacturing. It can be 
argued that there are distinct differences in above approach to be 
found in the construction industry. The construction industry 
differs to manufacturing for a number of reasons. Construction, 
defined ‘in its broadest sense to include all built structures and the 
professional services necessary to execute such work’ (Eaton, 
Akbiyikli and Dickinson 2006:12) is subject to location specificity 
(Hillebrandt in Ofori 2003:381); in that physical construction is 
geographically immobile and often subject to local design and 
building codes. Construction firms trade in contract goods rather 
than pre-made exchange goods. In the terminology of the New 
Institutional Economics, there is a time lag between the signing of 
a contract and the exchange of property rights in construction 
(Alchian and Woodward, 1988: in Brockmann, 2009: 170). Pheng 
and Hongbin (2004) briefly survey internationalisation theories and 
observe that the most notable application of internationalisation 
theory in the construction industry is probably the works of 
Seymour (1987) in which Dunning’s eclectic paradigm was 
adopted to analyse the multinational construction industry. 
Subsequently, Dunning (1989) has explicitly explored the 
application of his eclectic paradigm to the service sector including 
construction services. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm has remained 
the dominant analytical framework for accommodating a variety of 
economic theories concerning the determinants of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the foreign activities of MNEs for over two 
decades (Caves 1996; Dunning 2002).  
Dunning (2008: 99-100) notes that the principal hypothesis of 
the eclectic paradigm is “that the level and structure of a firm’s 
foreign value-adding activities will depend on four conditions 
being satisfied. They are: 
 
1. The extent to which it (enterprise) posses unique and 
sustainable ownership (O) advantages vis-à-vis firms of other 
nationalities, in  servicing of particular markets or groups of 
markets… 
2. Assuming that condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which 
the enterprise perceives it to be in its best interest to add value 
to its O advantages than to sell them, or their right of use, to 
independent foreign firms. These advantages are called 
market internalisation (I) advantages… 
3. Assuming that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent 
to which the global interest of the enterprise are served by 
creating, accessing or utilizing , its O advantages in a foreign 
location (L)… 
4. Given the configuration of the OLI advantages facing a 
particular firms, the extent to which a firm believes that 
foreign production is consistent with the long-term objectives 
of its stakeholders and instructions underpinning its 
managerial and organizational strategic.” 
 
In relation to generalised predictions of the eclectic paradigm, 
or OLI framework, Dunning (2008: 100) also notes that “At any 
given moment in time, the more a country’s enterprises – relative to 
those of another - possess desirable O advantages, the greater the 
incentive they have to internalize rather than externalize their use, 
the more they find it in their interest to access or exploit them in a 
foreign location, then the more they are likely to engage out-bound 
FDI. By the same token, a country is likely to attract in-bound 
investment by foreign MNE’s when the reverse conditions apply.” 
Thus, of particular relevance to the aim in this paper and 
explaining multinational contractors’ willingness to bid for 
Australian public sector major infrastructure projects, are the 
reverse conditions indicted by Dunning. 
Despite the OLI dominance as theory of internationalisation 
for over two decades, it has seen limited application in terms of 
multinational construction. Beyond Seymour (1987) and Abdul’s 
(1995) critique of Seymour’s approach, the empirical work 
concerning the OLI framework and multinational contracting 
focuses on out-bound FDI amongst individual multinational 
contractors or multinational contractors collectively as an industry 
representing a particular country (Cuervo and Pheng 2003a and b; 
Pheng and Hongbin 2004 and 2006; Pheng, Hongbin and Leong 
2004). Moreover, this body of work includes developing a range of 
factors to which Likert scale responses are sought. Dunning (2002: 
6-7) is critical of this type of survey work that asks firms to 
identify the reasons for their behavior. He considers, “It is clear 
that these studies can, at best, do little more than identify and 
perhaps rank by importance the sort of factors which business take 
into account in establishing production units abroad…in summary, 
they may be criticized, partly because they fail to differentiate 
between motives and determinants, partly because they do not 
identify the assumptions underlying the answers given by firms, 
and partly because no attempt is made to normalize for differences 
in the characteristics of firms or countries”. In contrast, Chen 
(2008) does investigate in-bound FDI but does not explicitly 
deploy the OLI framework and does not focus on any particular 
host country. In summary and in the context of multinational 
contracting, there is a lack of attention to in-bound FDI, along with 
a lack of empirical work that deploys the OLI framework using 
theories advocated by the framework to guide generating questions 
that separate priority variables concerning cause and consequence, 
or effect, variables in conjunction with behavioural assumptions 
that are embedded in these theories. 
The planned research described in this paper will be, to the 
authors’ knowledge, the first empirical study to deploy the OLI 
framework to in-bound FDI (to Australia as the host country) and 
using the dominant economic theories advocated by Dunning 
mindful of the nature of the study and its context or multinational 
construction. 
 
3. DEPLOYING THE OLI FRAMWOROK 
 
3.1 Operationalising OLI  
 
The first step towards deploying or operationalising the OLI 
framework to inbound FDI by multinational contractors to 
Australia, is to select the appropriate theories and approach to be 
used in respect of each of the three types of advantages represented 
by the OLI framework. This selection is based on the nature of the 
study’s time horizon and the motivation for seeking FDI.  
The planned research presented in this paper, comprises a 
cross-sectional study and therefore deploys the OLI in its static 
form. Accordingly, static and not dynamic versions of the 
economic theories identified by Dunning as relevant to the OLI 
framework are selected.  In terms of the motivation for seeking 
FDI within the OLI framework, Dunning (2008: 67-68) identifies 
four main types of foreign production: 
 
1. Natural resource seekers; 
2. Efficiency seekers; 
3. Market seekers; and 
4. Strategic asset or capabilities seekers 
 
The initial position taken in terms of the research project 
mentioned in this paper, is to effectively discount the first type of 
motivation for foreign production as of relatively lesser importance 
in the context of multinational contracting. As mentioned 
previously, construction activity is subject to location specificity in 
that physical construction is geographically immobile and the 
target of the FDI is to add value to delivering a good or piece of 
infrastructure in the host country and in which the multinational 
contractor’s services are embodied. In this sense, multinational 
contractors are not seeking to obtain raw materials or other factors 
of production from the host country through FDI to directly 
contribute towards delivery of their services in a location outside 
the host country. Therefore, the other three types of motive form 
the focus in this paper, with efficiency seeking and market seeking 
considered to be related (Dunning 2002: 409). That is, the delivery 
of major infrastructure is a highly specialized activity that requires 
significant investment in special purpose technology concerning 
knowledge bases, and technological hardware and software. 
Consistent with the first condition in the OLI framework, to obtain 
sustainable competitive advantage in at least the firm’s home 
market, the firm would have needed to create sufficient demand in 
its home market to justify these investments.  High technology 
firms increasingly need to widen their markets to absorb fixed 
costs from economics of scale and scope and may enter into 
collaborative arrangements to reduce risks of these investments – 
and particularly so when faced with falling domestic demand 
(Dunning 1989; 15). Having developed the likely motivations for 
multinational contractors seeking FDI, the most relevant theories 
can now be identified by reference to Dunning (2002) 
prescriptions. 
 
3.2 O advantages  
 
With regard to the group of theories advocated by Dunning to 
explain static O advantages across the various types of motivation 
for seeking FDI, Dunning (2002: 414-415) identifies the Resource-
Based Theory (RBT) in terms of both market seeking (MS) and 
strategic asset seeking (SAS). That is, RBT on the application of 
identifying and evaluating variables influencing the sustainable 
competitive advantage of MS firms and also RBT reflecting FDI 
designed to augment domestic-based resources and capabilities in 
SAS firms. 
Barney (2002: 155) notes that RBT has two fundamental 
assumptions: “First, building on Penrose, this work assumes that 
firms can be thought of as bundles of productive resources and 
those different firms possess different bundles of these resources. 
This is the assumption of resource heterogeneity. Second, drawing 
from Selznick and Ricardo, this approach assumes that some of 
these resources are either very costly to copy or inelastic in supply. 
This is the assumption of resource immobility”. These two 
fundamental assumptions are preconditions for RBT’s other 
variable assumptions comprising: value, rarity, immitability and 
organization (“VRIO framework”) and are seen as observable 
consequences of resource heterogeneity and immobility. Barney 
(2002) develops questions relating to the VRIO framework of a 
resource and as a means to analysing this resource within a firm, in 
terms of it being either a competitive strength or a weakness. 
Resources or activities reflected at a high level on all four variables 
in VRIO framework are considered to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage - when associated with the firm’s dominant 
source of revenue or core business. Towards meeting the first 
condition in the OLI hypothesis, the multinational contractors 
would be expected to have obtained a sustainable competitive 
advantage based on firm specific advantages in its domestic market 
before contemplating FDI. The position to be developed in the 
research project mentioned in this paper then divides into different 
expectations for MS multinational contractors and SAS 
multinational contractors. MS multinational contractors are 
expected to consider their key activity or source of competitive 
advantage to be at least equal to multinational contractors 
domiciled in Australia – the host country (as measured by relative 
VRIO levels pertaining to the key activity concerned) and this time 
home specific advantages of the multinational contractor that is 
contemplating FDI and which are relative to Australia, can be 
included. Whilst SAS multinational contractors will have inferior 
VRIO levels on their key activity relative to multinational 
contractors domiciled in Australia.  
 
3.3 L advantages  
 
This time, Dunning (2002: 420-421) refers to traditional location 
theories and theories related to spatially specific transaction costs 
that may inform the assessment of potential costs and revenues 
made by both MS and SAS multinational contractors pertaining to 
the target host market and which in this case is Australia. 
With regard to potential costs and revenues, a number of 
factors would be of common interest and affect, in the same 
direction, the attractiveness of the host market to both MS and SAS 
multinational contractors. This would include factors such as the 
size of the market; host governments’ attitudes, polices and 
regulatory framework; industrial structure; resource and manpower 
quality and availability; costs of doing business; research and 
development factors and project factors. However, the actual 
relative attractiveness of the host market to different multinational 
contractors is determined by a home-host country induced 
differential arising from cultural, administrative, geographic and 
economic distances (Cuevo and Pheng 2003). Here costs and 
associated risks are created by linking the firm and home specific 
advantages associated with the MS or SAS multinational contractor 
with the country specific advantage of the host country. With 
reference to the logic of Transaction Cost Economics, Rugman and 
Verbeke (2005: 13) describes these costs and risks as location-
specific linking investments and suggests that “It is, ceteris 
paribus, the extent of these adaption costs, taking into account the 
redeployability of the resulting additional knowledge in the 
relevant locations, that explains why most MNEs expand first in 
their home region, and may face great difficulty expanding to other 
regions.”  The treatment of location in this way, may help explain 
the relatively small number of multinational contractors in 
Australia from its home region, notably China; South Korea and 
Japan.  
 
3.3 I advantages  
 
Dunning (2002: 424) relies on orthodox internalisation theory to 
explain internalisation associated with FDI and notes, “as long as 
the transaction coordination costs of using external arms-length 
markets in the exchange of intermediate products, information, 
technology, marketing techniques, etc. exceed those incurred by 
internal hierarchies, then it will pay a firm to engage in FDI, rather 
than conclude a licensing or another market-related agreement with 
a foreign producer.” However, given the immobile nature of 
construction and the necessity to have on-the-spot interactions with 
the client, co-consortium members and subcontractors and 
suppliers, the issue is not so much if internalisation occurs but 
more how much internalisation occurs. And more specifically, the 
nature of the entry mode decision for MS and SAS multinational 
contractors.  Chen (2008) considers that permanent entry is 
different from mobile entry on the basis of whether the entrant has 
ownership or equity in a permanent organisation. For example, a 
sole venture company, a joint venture company or branch office. In 
contrast, mobile entry reflects contractual modes – for example, 
sole venture project, joint venture project and PPP style projects. 
Based on an empirical study Chen (2005, 2008) observes that the 
current construction arena sees a mix of both permanent and 
mobile entry modes. 
More permanent entry mode naturally occurs amongst SAS 
multinational contractors and so the research project mentioned in 
this paper will include an investigation into the incidence and 
preferences amongst MS multinational contractors for permanent 
and /or mobile entry. The research project will also seek to 
establish whether the entry mode used by MS and SAS 
multinational contractors can be explained using transaction cost 
logic alone, or whether other cost and benefits need to be 
considered. For example, cost and benefits associated with a 
particular project, including its size and complexity, along with the 
availability of suitable local firms for merger or acquisition (Bridge 





Beyond addressing the research gap identified – in terms of the 
first empirical study to deploy the OLI framework to in-bound FDI 
to Australia and using the dominant economic theories advocated 
by Dunning mindful of the context of multinational contracting, the 
research project mentioned in this paper is anticipated to yield a 
number of practical benefits. These include estimates of the 
potential scope to attract more multinational contractors to bid for 
Australian public sector infrastructure, including the nature and 
extent to which this scope can be influenced by Australian 
governments responsible for the delivery of infrastructure. On the 
other hand, the research project is also expected to indicate the 
extent to which indigenous and other multinational contractors 
domiciled in Australia are investing in special purpose technology 
and achieving productivity gains relative to foreign multinational 
contractors. This can be evidenced by VRIO measurements 
associated with RBT (used to capture O advantages) and 
corroborated by the extent of mergers and acquisitions and other 
related forms of interest shown by foreign multinational 
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